Alongside these forces, the use of information operations, such as cyberattacks, can be very hard to clearly attribute to particular state actors. It emphasizes just enough plausible deniability to create a degree of separation from a conflict to present major war.īecause irregular forces-whether insurgent or more formally organized proxy forces, mercenaries, motorcycle gangs, covert special forces, or (occasionally) the concealed use of conventional forces-offer a different optic than traditional military forces, supporting states can deny their use. Hybrid war-which essentially depends on military force in an irregular or nontraditional manner alongside destabilizing information operations-relies on the denial of such attribution. While so-called hybrid or gray zone conflict may work extremely well for autocracies, such as Russia, it would be far more challenging for Western democracies to manage support for an insurgency on the scale of a potential Ukraine conflict without fairly clear attribution. But what second- and third-order risks would such an insurgency run? This could be in an active role or in the shape of volunteers-whether former or current special operators. After two decades of fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO’s highly effective and combat-proven special forces would be extremely capable of switching to the task of supporting and prosecuting an insurgency rather than fighting one. A Ukraine insurgency would be a natural return to their original mission in Eastern Europe-one for which they have always been highly suited. Army Special Forces, originally created to challenge the Soviet Union by fomenting insurgencies inside the Iron Curtain-though instead they ended up fighting one in Southeast Asia. Volunteers and the commitment of covert support would soon follow as well, particularly should Ukrainian insurgents acting initially on their own prove themselves capable of drawing Russian blood.ĭe oppresso liber (“ to liberate the oppressed”) is the motto of the U.S. Nearby democracies-such as Poland and the Baltics, all recent additions to NATO with long and justified historical reasons to fear Russian aggression-as well as patriotic and romantic histories of guerrilla resistance movements will almost certainly give safe haven to such fighters. But such an insurgency is instead likely to lead to even further conflict with the West, whose safe havens and clear anti-Russian support of a Ukrainian resistance would likely lead Russian President Vladimir Putin to further intervention as he struggles to maintain domestic stability in the face of mounting casualties.Ī rapid Russian invasion would likely leave many former Ukrainian soldiers as well as civilians in the possession of arms and equipment as well as the motivation to retake their country. It’s tempting to think that this would be costly only to Russia, a bleeding wound that deters further adventurism. Russia is likely to find itself stretched to hold conquered territory and be drawn into the quagmire of insurgency.

However, rather than the end of conflict, many analysts-such as FP colleague John Nagl -have suggested this could be just the beginning.

Although Ukraine’s military has made major reforms, its ability to deter Russia’s advanced capabilities, numbers, and geographic advantage is limited, and it may find itself quickly overwhelmed. Despite Western military aid and the threat of punishing sanctions that would follow Russian intervention in Ukraine, invasion appears imminent-perhaps to seize the Donbass region or attempt to conquer Ukraine as a whole.

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